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Introduction
The submission provides a summary of the research conducted by Professor Nicholas 
Ryder on the Bribery Act 2010.  The submission presents a summary of the key 
findings in the hope that they will support the House of Lords Select Committee’s 
inquiry into the Bribery Act 2010.
Questions 
2. Is the Bribery Act 2010 being adequately enforced? If not, how could 
enforcement be improved? Do the Serious Fraud Office and the Crown 
Prosecution Service have the right approach and the resources they need to 
investigate and prosecute bribery offences effectively? 
Background
The United Kingdom’s (UK) reform of its bribery laws began with the publication of a 
Law Commission Report in 1998.1  The Law Commission recommended that ‘the 
common law offence of bribery and the statutory offences of corruption should be 
replaced by a modern statute’.2 The then Labour government responded by 
publishing the Corruption Bill, which after being subjected to pre-legislative scrutiny 
by the Joint Committee, was rejected, resulting in a revised version which was 
published in 2005.3  This was followed by another consultation exercise by the Law 
Commission in 2007,4 which subsequently led to the publication of its 2008 Report.5  
In response to this Report, and to emphasis the impetus to address the threat posed 
by bribery, the then Justice Secretary, Jack Straw MP stated “a new law will provide 
our investigators and prosecutors with the tools they need to deal with bribery much 
more effectively.6  The Report was followed by the publication of a White Paper in 
2009 that finally resulted in the enactment of the Bribery Act 2010.7  Prior to its 
introduction, Kenneth Clarke MP, the then Secretary of State for Justice, stated that 
the Act would “reinforce its [the UKs] reputation as a leader in the global fight 
against corruption . . . The Act will ensure that the UK is at the forefront of the battle 
against bribery allowing the country to clamp down on corruption without being 
burdensome to business”.8  However, the provisions of the Bribery Act 2010 have 
received a mixture of responses from commentators.  For example, some have 
suggested that the provisions ‘go too far and fear [that] the new ‘gold standard’ 
legislation poses a threat to UK competitiveness’.9  Conversely, it has also been 
described as a ‘major piece of legislation, of immense practical importance to the 
conduct of business, whether in the public or private sphere’.10 
Enforcement – pre Bribery Act 2010
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The enforcement response to the criminal offences under the Bribery Act 2010 has 
failed to achieve the political aspirations outlined above.  A person found guilty of 
any of the offences contained in sections 1, 2 and 6 of the Bribery Act 2010 is liable 
to a maximum custodial sentence of 10 years imprisonment and/or an unlimited 
fine. For the offence found in section 7, the maximum penalty is an unlimited fine11. 
Although the Serious Fraud Office (SFO) is arguably the lead agency in prosecuting 
cases of bribery and corruption, proceedings under the Act require the personal 
consent of not just the Director of the SFO but also, either the Director of Public 
Prosecutions or the Director of Revenue and Customs Prosecutions.12 The Crown 
Prosecution Service (CPS) has stated that not only is bribery a serious offence, but 
that ‘there is an inherent public interest in bribery being prosecuted’.13 In 
determining whether or not to prosecute, the CPS will take into account both 
aggravating and mitigating factors. These might include the amount of money 
involved; whether there has been a breach of a position of trust; whether it involved 
a vulnerable or elderly victim; the period over which the offence was carried out; 
whether any voluntary repayments had been made and whether there were any 
personal factors such as disability, illness or family difficulties.14 
Historically, however, and particularly with reference to the situation prior to the 
Bribery Act 2010, there have been few criminal cases taken to trial (see below); with 
this situation continuing even after the de Grazia Review in 2008.15 The few 
examples which do exist include one case from September 2009, where a British 
construction company, Mabey and Johnson, were held liable for bribing foreign 
officials in order to win business contracts. The company pleaded guilty to overseas 
corruption charges, for paying €1m million in bribes through middlemen with 
reference to £60-£70m contracts, and to the breaching of United Nations Iraq 
sanctions relating to Saddam Hussein’s ‘Oil for Food Programme’. The case 
concluded with a plea bargain, which led to a financial penalty of £3.5m, in addition 
to compensation payable to the countries of Ghana, Jamaica and Iraq and legal costs 
totalling £3.1m. Interestingly, this was the first conviction in the UK of a company 
for such offences with the SFO deciding to prosecute the company rather than the 
actual individuals involved.16 However, the number of convictions has begun to 
increase and perhaps due to this there are now sentencing guidelines to help judges 
determine the most appropriate sentence. Initially the only available aid came in the 
form of two Court of Appeal cases; both of which were decided prior to 2010. The 
first R v Anderson (Malcolm John),17 involved the appeal of a sentence of 12 months 
imprisonment for accepting a bribe in return for contracts which were beneficial to 
the appellant’s business. On the basis that the appellant was of previous good 
character and that the financial gain was relatively small, a sentence of six months 
was held to be more appropriate. The second is that of R v Francis Hurell.18 The 
sentence in question was again for 12 months, but this time was for attempting to 
bribe a police officer, through the offering of £2,000 so that the officer would not 
carry out a breath test. Even though the Court held that any attempt to bribe a 
police officer in the execution of his duty was serious, it nevertheless substituted the 
sentence for one of three months. 
Such guidance may have been useful in the case of Mark Jessop, who in April 2011 
was sentenced to a two-year custodial sentence and ordered to pay £150,000 in 
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compensation and £25,000 in prosecution costs. The orders were in relation to ten 
counts of engaging in activities which made funds available to the Iraqi government 
in contravention of UN Iraq sanctions, again in relation to the ‘Oil for Food 
Programme’.19 Other criminal prosecutions include Dennis Kerrison, Paul Jennings, 
Militiades Papachristos and David Turner, all former executives of Innospec Ltd, who 
in October 2011 were charged with corruption in relation to making and conspiring to 
make corrupt payments to public officials in Indonesia and Iraq in order to secure 
contracts for the business.20 In January 2012 Turner pleaded guilty to three counts 
of conspiracy to corrupt and in June and July 2012 Jennings also pleaded guilty to 
three counts of conspiracy. Both Kerrison and Papachristos were convicted of one 
count of conspiracy each in June 2014.21 Turner was sentence to 16 months in 
custody, suspended for two years with 300 hours of unpaid work. Kerrison, Jennings 
and Papchristos were sentenced to four years, two years and 18 months in custody 
respectively, although Kerrison’s sentenced was later reduced to three years by the 
Court of Appeal. Innospec Ltd pleaded guilty to bribing state officials in Indonesia 
and was fined $12.7m.22   The first criminal conviction of a corporate for offences 
involving the bribery of foreign public officials took place in December 2014. Smith & 
Ouzman Ltd, a company which specialised in printing security documents, was 
convicted of offences of corruptly agreeing to make payments totalling nearly 
£500,000.23 The payments were used to influence who was awarded business 
contracts in both Mauritania and Kenya. Nicholas Smith (Sales and Marketing 
Manager) and Christopher Smith (Chairman) were also convicted. Smith and 
Ouzman Ltd was ordered to pay £2.2 million; Nicholas Smith received a custodial 
sentence of three years and Christopher Smith a sentenced of 18 months, suspended 
for two years, 250 hours of unpaid work and a three month curfew.24
Enforcement – Bribery Act 2010
The convictions covered so far in this report have been for offences under the old 
pieces of legislation, namely the Prevention of Corruption Act 1906 and the Criminal 
Law Act 1977. In December 2014, however, the SFO secured its first convictions 
under the Bribery Act 2010 against Gary West and Stuart Stone.  Both men were 
executives of Sustainable Growth Group and/or its subsidiary companies. The men, 
with James Whale, were involved in a fraud to induce people to invest via a pension 
plan in green bio fuel products. West received bribes for his role in producing false 
invoices to facilitate the fraud submitted by Stone.25 For the bribery offences, West 
received four years imprisonment and Stone six years.26   Since the implementation 
of the Bribery Act 2010, there have also been a very small number of successful 
prosecutions brought by the Crown Prosecution Service.  For example, in R v Patel, 
the defendant was a clerk at a magistrate’s court clerk, who was bribed £500 for not 
inputting information about a traffic violation onto a court database.  Patel later 
pleaded guilty and was sentenced to a total of nine years imprisonment for bribery 
and misconduct offences although this was reduced to four years on appeal. The 
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next successful prosecution under the Bribery Act was R v Mushtaq.  The defendant 
offered a bribe to a licensing officer from Oldman Council to pass him on a driving 
test that he had failed. In December 2012 Mushtaq was given a two month custodial 
sentence, suspended for 12 months and a two month curfew order.27  Finally, in April 
2013 Li Yang, a postgraduate student was convicted of attempting to bribe his 
university professor after he had failed his dissertation.  The defendant pleaded 
guilty to bribery and possessing an imitation firearm and was sentenced to a 
custodial sentence of 12 months.28  
Financial Regulation
In addition, and perhaps instead of, criminal liability, the Financial Conduct Authority 
also has the power to impose civil fines under section 206(1) of the Financial 
Services and Markets Act 2000.29  The use of this was seen in July 2011, when the 
FSA (as it was then) fined Willis Limited £6.895 million for weaknesses in its anti-
bribery and corruption systems and controls.30  The FSA, in 2011, also fined Aon 
Limited £5.25 million for ‘failing to take reasonable care to establish and maintain 
effective systems and controls to counter the risks of bribery and corruption 
associated with making payments to overseas firms and individuals’31.  Here, the 
FSA determined that Aon Ltd had ‘failed to properly assess the risks involved in its 
dealings with overseas firms and individuals who helped it win business and failed to 
implement effective controls to mitigate those risks’. 32  More recently, the FCA fined 
JLT Speciality Limited £1.8 million for an ‘unacceptable approach to bribery and 
corruption risks from overseas payments’.33  The FCA concluded that the company 
‘was found to have failed to conduct proper due diligence before entering into a 
relationship with partners in other countries who helped JLT Speciality Limited secure 
new business, known as overseas introducers. JLT Speciality Limited also did not 
adequately assess the potential risk of new insurance business secured through its 
existing overseas introducers’.34  Furthermore, in 2014, the FCA fined Besso Limited 
£315,000 for ‘failing to take reasonable care to establish and maintain effective 
systems and controls for countering the risks of bribery and corruption’.35  The FCA 
concluded ‘Besso failed to ensure that they had proper systems and controls in place 
to counter the risks of bribery and corruption in their business activities’.36  
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An important development in has been the creation of the Senior Management 
Certification Regime (SMCR) following the enactment of the Financial Services Act 
2012.  This could provide the FCA with an opportunity to overcome the problems 
associated with the identification doctrine, and assist in tackling corporate economic 
crime.37 The SMCR has two objectives: to encourage all staff within the financial 
services sector to take responsibility for their actions and that authorised firms and 
employees can clearly illustrate where the responsibility lies. The SMCR provides that 
a corporation’s senior management is responsible for the policies, systems and 
controls that are designed to reduce the threat posed by financial crime. Therefore, 
the SMCR places the obligation of the regulated corporations to limit the risk posed 
by financial crime on its senior management. The FCA is attempting to improve the 
culture within firms and is clearly placing the burden on senior managers to limit the 
risk posed by financial crime. Such efforts are to be welcomed, yet the extension to 
make senior managers accountable for a firm’s financial crime obligations are from 
innovative and this ‘new’ initiative duplicates the existing obligations under the FCA. 
Nonetheless, financial crime related breaches of the SMCR by senior managers would 
enable the FCA and potentially prosecutors to identify a corporation’s senior 
management who could meet requirements of the identification doctrine. This form 
of combined financial regulatory and criminal law response to financial crime 
breaches by corporations can be classified as a ‘hybrid’ approach and it would go 
some way to resolving the problems associated with the identification doctrine. This 
would be a novel step in the UK’s efforts to tackle corporate financial crime, but it 
would require a more joined-up approach between the FCA and prosecutorial 
agencies.
7. Has the introduction of Deferred Prosecution Agreements (DPAs) been a 
positive development in relation to offences under the Bribery Act 2010? 
Have DPAs been used appropriately and consistently? Has their use reduced 
the likelihood that culpable individuals will be prosecuted for offences under 
the Act? 
In addition to the usual criminal options, the Crime and Courts Act 2013 provides the 
SFO with an important weapon in its armoury against those companies who fail to 
prevent bribery under s.  of the Bribery Act 2010.   Under s. 45 of the 2013 Act,38 
the SFO or the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) is permitted to use a Deferred 
Prosecution Agreement or DPA.39  The Crime and Courts Act 2013 states that 
‘persons who may enter into a DPA with a prosecutor’ can be divided into three 
categories including a company, a partnership or an unregistered organisation.40  It 
is important to note, that DPAs are not available to individuals. A DPA is a 
contractual agreement between a financial regulatory agency or government agency 
and a corporation, who is under investigation for breaching the law. The main 
purpose of a DPA is to permit the offending corporation to illustrate good conduct, to 
cooperate with the investigating agencies, pay a fine and improve its internal 
corporate governance procedures. The first DPA used was seen in Serious Fraud 
Office v Standard Bank Plc in November 2015.  Here, Standard Bank Plc was accused 
of breaching s. 7 of the Bribery Act 2010 and the proceedings were stopped once the 
use of the DPA was approved by the courts.  As a result of this decision, Standard 
Bank agreed to pay financial orders totalling $25.2m, an additional $7m to the 
Tanzanian government and SFOs costs totalling £330,000.41  It is worth noting that 
Standard Bank Plc was not criminally convicted of bribery or corruption offences.  
This was followed by a second DPA against XYX Ltd who agreed to ‘pay financial 
orders of £6.5m, comprised of a £6.2m disgorgement of gross profits and a 
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£352,000 financial penalty’.42 In 2017, Rolls-Royce agreed to enter into a DPA that 
‘involve[d] payments of £497m. . . [and] Rolls-Royce [were] also reimbursing the 
SFO’s costs in full’.43 In April 2017, the SFO announced that it had entered into a 
DPA with Tesco which was required to pay a fine of £129 million for overstating its 
profits.44 Interestingly, in each of the four DPAs obtained by the SFO, no criminal 
prosecutions have been brought against any of the offending corporation’s 
employees or agents, thus drawing similar comparisons with the recent use of DPAs 
in the United States of America (US). This is not surprising given the initial lack of 
enthusiasm shown by the SFO and Crown Prosecution Service towards prosecuting 
individuals under the Bribery Act 2010. It is somewhat disappointing that no 
prosecutions have been brought in each of the four DPAs agreed between the 
corporations and the SFO, thus similarities exist between the approach in the US and 
the UK. If prosecutions were pursued against the employees or agents by the SFO 
for breaches of the Bribery Act 2010, it would represent an additional form of 
deterrent and would go some way to avoid any more ‘profound apologies’ from 
offending corporations.45 
Conclusions
 The UK’s efforts to tackle financial crime concentrated on targeting individuals 
as opposed to corporations. The unsatisfactory nature of this stance, led to 
the introduction of the failure to prevent bribery corporate offence. This has 
secured several DPAs against corporations, but there have been no bribery 
related prosecutions pursued in conjunction. This position is unsatisfactory. 
 DPAs must be used in conjunction with criminal proceedings against 
employees and/or agents of corporations if they are to have a deterrent effect 
to reduce future misconduct. 
 The introduction of the SMCR by the FCA is the most significant mechanism 
that could be used to overcome the restrictive interpretation of the doctrine of 
corporate criminal. 
 By placing the management of financial crime control within the remit of a 
corporation’s ‘senior management’, this will allow the courts to identify the 
person who within a corporate structure meets the controlling mind test. The 
ability to recognise the person who has the controlling mind could go some 
way to redress this problem. 
 In order for this approach to be adopted, it would require the FCA to liaise 
with the SFO and other prosecutors to implement this innovative mechanism. 
The ability of the FCA to instigate financial penalties draws unfavourable 
comparisons with the provisions in the USA.
 The UK should introduce legislation based on the Financial Institutions Reform, 
Recovery and Enforcement Act 1989. Such above would provide the FCA and 
other related enforcement agencies with the ability to pursue a series of civil 
actions against corporations for financial crime. 
In addition to these suggestions, the Select Committee may be interested some of 
these research publications that provide a more in-depth commentary on the Bribery 
Act 2010:
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